The China Problem

Unlike America, China has little incentive to prevent Iran from developing a nuclear arsenal. China is currently the number two importer of Iranian oil (behind Japan) and is looking to import more. China does not look at Iran through Western eyes; where we see human rights abuses and Islamic extremism; China simply sees a country with lots of oil and natural gas.

There is no ideological linkage between Tehran and Beijing, and China is not worried about Iranian encroachment into Central Asia. For China, the Iranian question is one solely related to economics. The Chinese government believes that their political future is directly linked to the high growth rates that have been characteristic of recent years. This growth has been fueled, both figuratively and literally, by oil from the Persian Gulf. Iran and Saudi Arabia represent the number two and three oil import sources for China. In total, China receives over forty percent of its oil from the Middle East. Any sanctioning or military action taken against Iran may threaten China’s oil supply. Any disruption in the flow of oil into China would wreck havoc on GDP growth rates, which in turn could spell political upheaval and civilian unrest. This is something the Chinese want to avoid at all costs.

China faces no existential threat from Iran. Although it has a domestic problem with Islamic separatists, the Uighurs, the Beijing has tight control over its territory. The East Turkestan Islamic Movement, an Islamic Uighur organization has carried out several attacks in China, most notably the attack that occurred four days before the 2008 Olympics that killed fourteen. Although it has been rumored that the East Turkestan Islamic Movement has ties to Al Qaeda, it is doubtful that Iran has provided them with any training or material support.

The Chinese see little benefit in ratcheting up pressure on Iran. America has no real chips that it can cash in to persuade them to change their minds. Washington does not want to start a pressuring China, especially at a time when Beijing has expressed concern over America’s rising deficit and contracting purchasing power. The recent downturn in the world economy has emboldened China, whose wealth of foreign currency is allowing it to play a greater roll in the IMF. China is also supporting an idea, first floated by the Russians, which would create a new world currency that would displace American dollars as the currency held in reserve by countries around the world.

In her recent trip to China, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton was indicative of America’s waning influence over China. She backed away from past administrations’ stance on human rights in China and the Tibet issue. This signaled to the Chinese that their relationship with America is in the process of transitioning from a mentor-mentee to a co-equal one. In this relationship, America will be wary of critiquing the Chinese government in any meaningful way.

China might be willing to get onboard with tougher sanctions, if President Obama signals that such sanctions would be crucial to American policy that will bring a resolution to the Iran question. China wants the issue resolved in such a way Middle Eastern oil can securely proceed through the Straight of Hormuz. China would prefer that such a resolution comes about by peaceful means, and Beijing might help with sanctions if it believes that they would deter military action.

All China wants is a secure channel for its oil to pass through.

Iran, Nuclear Weapons, and Why You Should Care

There has been a lot talk from both presidential candidates about the importance of confronting the Iranian regime over the issue of nuclear weapons. When the vote counting is over and the president-elect is secured in his position; he will be forced to deal with the fact that there is a serious likelihood that confrontation between America and Iran will occur between the time of his confirmation as leader of the free world and the end of 2009. This paper will show why deterring Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons is so crucial to the US and world interests. It will present the policy options, one or more of which, the new president will pursue in the coming months.

Historical Background

The US-led invasion of Afghanistan in 2001 woke the Iranian regime (Ayatollahs) to the reality that the Bush presidency would be deeply interested in their part of the world. September 11 had awakened a giant whose president more closely resembled TR than the man who had initially promised not to engage in ‘nation building.’ This new reality led to suspicion, a suspicion that was partially mollified when the US threw out the Taliban, a long-time antagonist of Tehran. Iran went so far as to help the US in those early years of the Bush presidency (2001-2003), closing their northern border to fleeing members of Al-Qaeda and the Taliban and turning them over to coalition forces.

Believing that US aggression would not be completely consumed by Afghanistan and wary of the consequences for members of Bush’s ‘Axis of Evil,’ Iran began backing away from its clandestine nuclear weapons program, and offered dialogue with the US. The idea of talks was not taken seriously, however, and they were brushed aside. A Director of National Intelligence (DNI) report released in 2007 attests to Iran’s initial fear of US retribution for its nuclear weapons program and describes how it was temporarily shut down.

The Iranian attempt at unilateral détente was short-lived, however. The US invasion of Iraq emboldened Iran. Iraq, a long-time counterweight to Iran in the Middle East, had been a major source of Iranian pain since the Islamic Republic’s founding in 1979. Iraq invaded Iran in 1980, launching the modern Middle East’s bloodiest war to date. Saddam also harbored and funded Iranian dissidents. In 2003, this all came to an end. With the fall of Saddam Hussein and the US becoming bogged down in what seemed like hopeless quagmire, Iran seized on the opportunity to exploit a devastated Iraq and a distracted US. Iran restarted its nuclear weapons program with vigor in 2003, and estimates put them a year or two away from obtaining their first nuke. Iran sees the development of nuclear weapons both as a guarantor against future US intervention (see North Korea) and as a path to hegemony in the Middle East.

Defining the Threat

Eight countries (the US, Russia, the UK, France, China, India, Pakistan and North Korea) are known to have active nuclear weapons. A ninth (Israel) is widely suspected to have them as well. This logically leads to the question that, if semi-hostile China and Pakistan and openly-hostel North Korea have nuclear weapons then what would it matter if Iran develops them too? Iran, unlike China and Pakistan, which are economically and militarily dependent on the US, is neither tied to the US Dollar nor Marines. North Korea is a failing state, and only through Chinese aid is it able to feed its populace. Due to the recent rise in oil prices, Iran has little dependence on the West, or anyone else, whatsoever. If a non-nuclear Iran currently acts in an antagonistic manner towards the West, than a nuclear Iran would be able to step up its belligerently with nuclear immunity.

A nuclear-armed Iran poses a serious threat to the stability of an already volatile Middle East. As the world’s predominant supplier of weapons and training to international terrorist networks, a nuclear-armed Iran would be able to increase its terrorist activity and even pass along ‘dirty bombs’ to the likes of Hezbollah and Al-Qaeda in Iraq, who the Ayatollahs use as clients to oppose Israel and coalition forces in Iraq.

A nuclear Iran would seriously frighten the moderate Arab regimes from Amman to Riyadh. These regimes, already threatened by internal Islamic extremists who are funded by Iran, would feel the need to counter the Ayatollahs’ nuclear capabilities. This would fuel a nuclear arms race throughout the Middle East, a region full of weak regimes with extremists waiting in the wings for their shot at power. An extremist regime in Egypt or Saudi Arabia would be bad enough, but a nuclear-armed extremist regime would be catastrophic.

The US could attempt to moderate this arms race of course, but at a serious cost. Bush was willing to give Saudi Arabia $20 billion worth of weapons because of the threat of Iran developing nuclear weapons. The price of Saudi security would skyrocket once Tehran secured them. Also, just as during the Cold War the French doubted whether the US would ‘trade Paris for New York’ and thus felt the need for their own nukes; Egyptians and the like will have serious doubts of any commitment to ‘trade Cairo for New York.’

Since there is no clear chain of command in the Iranian military system, it is difficult to know who exactly is in charge. Keeping track of nuclear weapons in Islamabad and Beijing is hard enough, but keeping track of them in the deserts of Persia, where transparency has never been a virtue, would be exponentially more difficult.

Option One: Diplomacy (Carrot-Carrots and Carrot-Sticks)

The US has several options it can utilize in attempting to dissuade Iran from developing nuclear weapons. The carrot-carrot (reward-based diplomacy) approach includes: lifting sanctions, allowing entrance into the WTO and similar international organizations, large block grants for developmental purposes, restoring diplomatic relations and selling dual-use (military and non-military) parts for heavy machinery. All of these options have all been on the table at sometime during the past decade, yet none have lured Iran to give up its pursuit of nuclear weapons.

The carrot-stick (punishment-based diplomacy) approach is essentially a more vigorous continuation of the current US policy. The new president could push for additional United Nations Security Council (UNSC) sanctions against Iranian corporations, attempting to further cripple Iran’s economy and isolate Tehran. Also, he could increase the anti-Iranian rhetoric, pushing for the need for regime change and liberalization in Iran. Such rhetoric does resonate with the Iranian people, a large percentage of which are young and unemployed. He could also increase funding to reform and counter-revolutionary groups in Iran. These options have all been utilized during the past decade with little effect on the Ayatollahs. As of today, only the threat of a US invasion, as laid out in Bush’s ‘Axis of Evil Speech’ has had any real impact on Iran’s pursuit of nuclear weapons.

Option Two: Military Action

As mentioned above, only the threat of military action has had any discernable impact on the Ayatollahs. The US, however, is in a very weak position to strike Iran’s nuclear weapons facilities. Its forces are seriously stretched on two fields of battle, and US Marines are easy targets for Iranian-trained terrorists in Iraq.

The Iranians have learned from the past. Unlike the Osirak nuclear reactor in Iraq, which completely encapsulated the entirety of Saddam’s nuclear weapons program and was bombed by Israel in 1981, the Iranians have spread their program throughout the country. In addition to the main Natanz nuclear reactor, their program is currently operating in dozens of facilities. Iran has put some facilities in residential areas, meaning that a strike would result in tens if not hundreds of civilian deaths. Some of the facilities are underground. This means that any successful strike would need to include the use of ‘bunker buster’ bombs (a.k.a. mini nukes). This raises a serious issue, as it has been longstanding US policy not to use nuclear weapons. It would also be difficult for the new president to justify the use of nuclear weapons to deter the development of those same weapons. Assuming that the US has reliable intelligence on all of the crucial facilities involved in the Iranian nuclear weapons program, it would require a massive bombing campaign to destroy them all. Even if they were all hit, the Iranians still possess all the necessary technology and know how. This means that in addition to a successful strike, the US would still need to continue to dissuade the Iranians from developing nuclear weapons in the future.

The Israeli Factor

While the new president sets about implementing a program to deal with Iran, he must keep an eye on Israel. Israel has drawn two red lines in the sand that could trigger a preemptive Israeli strike on Iran. The first is tied to when the Natanz nuclear reactor produces enough highly enriched uranium to make a nuclear weapon. The second is connected to when Iran acquires an advanced air defense system it is currently trying to purchase from Moscow. Again, estimates have the first red line being crossed within a year or two. The second one could be crossed at any time, depending on Russia.

Although the US is able to exert serious pressure on Israel, it is highly unlikely that the new president could hold it back from acting when it feels that its very existence is threatened. This being said, any Israeli air strike would necessitate both US intelligence and permission to operate over Iraqi airspace, which the US controls. It will be up to the new president to properly leverage this against the Israelis to maximize the US position.

Transforming Mountains into Molehills

Transforming Mountains into Molehills

Despite everything, an Israeli-Syrian peace deal could move forward

Thanks to the committed work of Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan, Israel and Syria are in their fourth rounds of low-level talks. Despite this unprecedented peaceful interaction (the two nations last broke of talks in 2000), they are still as far away from any tangible “land-for-recognition” peace deal as they have ever been in the past decade. The Israeli Defense Force (IDF) is still licking its wounds from a resounding defeat in 2006 when the comparatively weak Hezbollah held them off for 33 days. Israel is also plagued by an unstable Kadima government lead by Prime Minister Olmert who is under investigation for multiple counts of fraud. Despite the Prime Minister’s aid's assertion that “the sky [has] not fallen,” many see Olmert as the very definition of a lame duck. With a Kadima primary set for September 17 of this year, there is no doubt that Foreign Minister Tzipi Livini or another party strongman will succeed him.

Unlike the United States, where presidents lose a considerable amount of power midway through their last year in office, Israeli prime ministers never fully lose control of the national agenda. Last week’s prisoner transfer with Hezbollah proves that the Olmert government is still able to effectively define the facts on the ground, meaning that despite the ongoing investigations against him, he may be able to make significant progress with the Syrians. It would be difficult for any future Israeli government, even one lead by Likud, to turn its back on major progress made with Syria. Israelis still overwhelmingly support peace with their northeastern neighbor, and any deal could have serious implications for the region. The Syrians are cautious of a weak Olmert but they too look forward to the change in the balance of power that negotiating a settlement with the Israelis would bring. Below is the framework for what a long overdue peace deal between Israel and Syria could look like.

At present, Syrian President Bashar Al-Assad is caught between a rock and a hard place. On one side, the United States has continued its push to keep Syria isolated from the West and the world community at large. UN Ambassador John Bolton went as far as to mention Syria in his ‘Beyond the Axis of Evil’ speech in 2002, and Dick Cheney and Paul Wolfowitz have alluded to the possibility of overthrowing the Assad regime. Although such a scenario was more plausible before the invasion of Iraq, it still scares the militarily weak Assad.

The United States’ verbal attacks on Syria have pushed it to form an unlikely alliance with Iran. Assad’s Alawite regime is hardly a natural ally of the Iranian Ayatollahs, who see his sect as an apostate version of Shiism. The Iranians have chosen to look beyond this fact, because of the strategic location that Syria plays in the region. With Syria’s acquiescence, Iran is able to funnel arms and training to Hezbollah and Hamas, which in turn widens the Iranian sphere of influence. With a strong Hezbollah in play, Iran is able to indirectly attack both Israel and the pro-Western Christian leadership in Beirut. It is no secret that the 2006 Israel-Hezbollah war began with the blessing of Tehran.

A destabilized Lebanon allows Syria to play a strong roll in the country. Hezbollah also acts as a buffer between the IDF and Damascus, ensuring that in any future conflict with Syria, Israel will have to fight a two-front war, a fact that keeps Israeli intelligence up at night while calming Assad. A weakened Lebanon also allows Syria to leverage its power over the lucrative legal and illegal financial centers in Beirut, providing hundreds of millions of dollars for the cash-strapped government.

Syria is wary of its current relationship with Iran, however. Damascus wants a weak Lebanon, not one controlled by the same extremists who run Tehran. Being surrounded by two potentially unfriendly Shii neighbors could prove dangerous for Syria who has continued to suppress its Shii minority. Because of this, Damascus is looking for a way to neutralize the Hezbollah threat by cutting of its supplies and training. This cannot be done however, until Syria has secured peace along its southern border with Israel. Until this is done, Damascus is determined to keep Hezbollah strong as a buffer against Tel Aviv.

Any peace deal with Syria is ultimately in Israel’s favor. The Golan Heights no longer holds the military significance that it did back in the 1970’s. Syrian missiles fired from Damascus can now reach Tel Aviv and Jerusalem. Despite this, the Syrian air force is still impotent, and any troops attacking Israel from the Golan could be easily taken out. Because of this, not even the conservative Netanyahu government (1996-1999) made any serious attempts to annex the Golan. Since 1973, it has been accepted that Israel would someday return it to Syria in exchange for a permanent peace deal.

Now that the Kadima government is failing, those in power are looking for any rays of hope that will help them maintain their power. Olmert is attempting to divert attention away from his domestic failings by engaging the international community in attempts to make any kind of peace. This has been evident for several months now, as Israel has vigorously pursued peace with Syria and the Palestinians, as well as making overt calls for peace with Lebanon. Olmert has recently turned towards the United States (Annapolis Conference, November 2007), France (Mediterranean Summit, July 2008) and Turkey (Syrian Talks, ongoing), looking for any way to get a major peace deal done before his power completely erodes. Nonetheless, any peace deal will in all likelihood come only after Olmert has left government, as the primary election will occur in two months and any deal will certainly take more time than that to complete.

Assad, for his part, does not want to legitimize Olmert in any way since he holds the Prime Minister personally responsible for the Israeli attack on the Syrian nuclear reactor last fall. The attack both reaffirmed Israel’s continued dominance of the skies and demonstrated Damascus’s inability to defend against Israeli incursions into its territory. Giving up the Golan would not weaken Israel’s ability to strike at Syria, as even the most advanced Russian anti-aircraft weapons were unable to detect the Israeli strike. Assad knows this, but he also knows that ‘liberating’ the Golan would provide a huge boost for the government internally while also allowing Syria to declare a victory over its life-long enemy.

The actual returning of the Golan would be primarily symbolic for both sides. Israel would get peace with a neighbor that it views primarily as a pest, while Syria would get back a relatively uninhabitable piece of territory that is militarily insignificant. What would not be symbolic however, would be the implications of a Golan deal. It would be a significant step in isolating Iran, as the United States would surely make serious overtures to Syria after peace was reached (at the behest of Israel). It would be a serious step towards neutralizing the military component of Hezbollah, which would see its weapons caches dry up. It would also signify that Syria was serious in normalizing the relationship with Lebanon that it established at the Mediterranean Summit. For these reasons, returning the Golan to Syria would be a victory for both Israel and the United States.

Are the Peacemakers Even Relevant?

Are the Peacemakers Even Relevant?

President Bush recently announced his shiny new Middle East Peace Initiative, which he hopes, will restore some luster to his seriously tarnished image. He plans to have Secretary Rice lead an international peace conference that will bring to the table the Jordanians, Egyptians, Saudis, French, British, Russian, the Israeli Prime Minister Olmert, the Palestinian President Abbas, and his Prime Minister Fayyad. Despite the far-reaching implications of the Arab-Israeli conflict, President Bush has failed to invite to the conference any of the parties whose participation could actually lead to a meaningful, long-term peace between Palestinians and Israelis. And, by failing to engage those who could turn the tide towards peace, Bush is missing a prime opportunity to remake America’s image that he so blatantly squandered in Iraq.
The parties whose presence will ensure at least an opportunity for viable peace are Marwan Barghouti, Hamas, Hezbollah, Syria, and Iran. Any peace negotiations must involve the non-state actors who create the daily realities in the Middle East. No longer can we afford to sit back and play outdated Cold War politics that fail to take into account those non-state actors. Our only hope for bringing about a lasting peace is by addressing those who act without state sanction. Hamas and Hezbollah are prime examples of such groups, as are the more extremist elements within the Iranian government, who act without consulting their political leaders. This said, it appears that despite his good intentions our lame-duck president has failed to do more than introduce a non-starter to the conversation of Middle East peace.

Irrelevant: The Moderate Arab States (Jordan, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia):

These countries are seen as too pro-Western by the Palestinian street, and hold little sway over residents in Hebron or Ramallah. Both Egypt and Jordan exploited the Palestinians under their control from 1948 until they signed peace agreements with Israel in 1976 and 1992 respectively. Neither one attempted to integrate the Palestinians in Gaza and the West Bank, instead choosing to funnel weapons to extremists in refugee camps. Their desire for proxy war with Israel meant guns and rockets instead of roads and power lines for the Palestinian people. Since peace was reached, the Hashemite King’s in Jordan have kept the West Bank as distant from Amman as possible, not wanting an influx of poor, Sunni Arabs to destabilize his regime. Egypt, not wanting to extend its already taxed government services has refused to give citizenship to its Palestinian population. In response to the recent events in Gaza, Egypt closed its embassy in Gaza City and stepped up its repression of the Muslim Brotherhood (Hamas’ parent organization). Saudi Arabia, despite its massive oil wealth, has done little to support to the Palestinian people. The Saudis give symbolic aid, but stop far short of providing anything meaningful. Because of their counterproductive actions in the PA and their close ties to America, none of these states hold enough sway over the Palestinians to get them to accept a peace deal.

Irrelevant: The Europeans (France, Great Britain, and Russia):

The British and French bid farewell to Mid East relevance back in 1956 when their serious miscalculations (see Suez Crisis) forced them to take a back seat in the region. The Russians lost prominence with the collapse of Arab nationalism at the hands of Israel in 1967 and 1973. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, the flow of Russian arms to the region faded along with the Arab’s interest in what Moscow had to say.

Irrelevant: The Unpopular Israeli (Prime Minister Olmert)

The Israeli public has not, and will not, forgive Olmert for his severely botched war against Hezbollah last summer. With his popularity hovering around 10% it appears that only the delay of the Winograd Report is saving him from an almost certain vote of no confidence. Israelis are notorious for sacking failed leaders, as was the case with the Golda Meir following the 1973 war. Despite the fact that Olmert was elected on a ‘unilateral withdrawal’ platform, any move towards peace he makes will face staunch opposition in the Knesset. The Israeli population, despite yearning for peace sees their Arab counterparts as unwilling to denounce terrorism, throwing a wrench in any future peace negotiations.

Irrelevant: The Weak Palestinians (President Abbas and Prime Minister Fayyad)

It has been said that no leader ‘without blood on his hands’ will ever be able to credibly represent the Palestinian people, who still sees violent opposition to Israel as a prerequisite for achieving statehood. The new prime minister, Fayyad has no such credibility. The Western-trained economist has no history of jihad against Israel or participation in the Second Intifada. This will always make him appear weak to the Palestinians. The very reasons that Fayyad is appealing to the West (a background in economics and opposition to armed resistance) make him ineffectual as a leader. The man who appointed him, President Abbas, is suffering from a lack of credibility as well. His recent split with ex-prime minister Ismail Haniya cost him control of Gaza, and any peace deal he makes with Israel will essentially create two Palestinian states, one in Gaza, and one in the West Bank. The Palestinian people will find this solution completely unacceptable and the extremists will use all available means to destroy any such peace deal.

Most Relavent: Marwan Barghouti

The one man who does have ‘blood on his hands’ and thus maintains the credibility necessary to lead the Palestinians to statehood is currently locked in an Israeli jail. His name is Marwan Barghouti. Although he is serving two consecutive life sentences for killing five Israelis his Prisoners Letter proves that he is willing to work with Israel to create a sustainable, singular Palestinian state. He is essentially the Palestinian strong man whose career has evolved along the lines of Ariel Sharon, who transformed from fighter to peacemaker without loosing the legitimacy and trust of his people. Is Israel willing to free this convicted terrorist? The fact is that there may not even be a choice. Since he represents a legitimate path towards peace, the Israeli government must free him for the long-term good that he will bring to the Middle East.

Relavent: The Terrorists and Those who Fund Them (Hamas, Hezbollah, Syria, and Iran)

By not inviting Hamas to the negotiating table, President Bush is essentially sinking the peace deal before it even has a chance to take form. Hamas is in complete control of Gaza. They are currently smuggling in weapons and explosives through the Philadelphi Corridor, which links Gaza to Egypt. Their ranks have swollen to 15,000 fighters and they continue to fire rockets into Israel. Daily, they demonstrate that they care more about killing Jews than improving the lives of Gazans. Their actions effectively veto any peace agreement signed by Abbas and Israel. Iran is actively financing Hamas and must be pressured to stop them from funneling the weapons into Gaza, an action that stalls the peace in its tracks. Syria and Hezbollah must also be brought into the conversation, as the ‘hot summer’ that Nasrallah promised (after meeting with the Iranian president Ahmadinejad in Damascus) will surely put any peace agreement on the backburner.

You make peace with your enemies not your friends. Bush, however, seems to be forgetting this paramount rule of realpolitik, it is not the moderate Arabs, Europeans, and Abbas we need to be talking with. We must reckon with the real players whose destabilizing actions would instantly torpedo any future peace deal. Gone are days when heads of states can sit down and sign comprehensive agreements ending hostilities. In today’s world non-state actors must be regarded as just as, or perhaps more important than the states they act within. President Bush must come to understand that a peaceful future in the Middle East depends on it.